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Abstract 
Do the actions of parents in withholding medical treatment from their children due 
to religious influence show wanton or reckless disregard for the safety and lives of their 
children? This project investigates the morally and legally complicated issue of the 
influence of religious beliefs in criminal negligence cases. My MRP is animated by the 
idea that similar cases in the past have been treated with leniency and ought to be given 
stricter punishments.  
I focus in particular on cases in which parents opt for alternative remedies or faith 
healing for ill children in ignorance or defiance of available medical treatments. I 
investigate the role of mistake of fact based on honest belief in prosecutions for criminal 
negligence causing death. Furthermore, I develop an argument that reliance on religious 
beliefs should not exculpate an accused parent from liability in criminal negligence cases.   
I argue that similar cases in the past have been treated with great leniency. This 
research proposes that cases of faith healing deaths be treated as cases of manslaughter, 
namely under section 222(5)(b), and that a minimum sentence of six years’ imprisonment 
be imposed for the death of vulnerable children.  
 
 
Key Words: manslaughter, criminal negligence, religious belief, mistake of fact, failure to 
provide necessaries, objective fault. 
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1. Introduction 
 Harrowing incidents of religion-based medical neglect cases in which parents, 
while adhering to the principles of their faiths, refuse to provide medical care to their 
children, are not unique to any particular faith or to any particular geographical region. 
While faith healing deaths occur infrequently in Canada, this phenomenon has imperiled 
some of the most vulnerable members of society. There have been several recent cases in 
which parents have not followed the advice of medical practitioners or have not sought any 
advice at all. Instead, they have opted for faith healing or alternative remedies to heal their 
ailing children. Although there may be success in these approaches to health and healing, 
many cases have resulted in very unfortunate outcomes – namely, the death of children.  
Where there exist proven and effective solutions to common illnesses in allopathic 
medicine1, why do individuals turn to alternative therapies? It is argued by Adrian 
Furnham, professor of psychology at the University College London, and clinical 
psychologist Bruce Kirkclady, that participation in alternative therapies is drawn out of a 
dissatisfaction with allopathic care as well as an attachment to the ideology of alternative 
care with the belief that it allows for a greater control over their health and healing.2 This 
argument is supported by philosopher Warren Salmon who categorizes peoples’ decisions 
to use alternative therapies into two broad groups: those relating to ideological aspect of 
alternative approaches to health care, and those relating to a dissatisfaction with allopathic 
 
1 “Allopathic medicine” refers to science-based modern medicine. It is a system in which medical 
doctors and healthcare professionals treat illnesses using drugs, surgery or radiation. It is also 
referred to as mainstream medicine, Western medicine, conventional medicine and biomedicine.; 
Elpern, David J. “Beyond Complementary and Allopathic Medicine” (1998) vol: 134 AOD at 11. 
(doi:10.1001/archderm.134.11.1473). 
2 Furnham, Adrian & Ravi Bhagrath. “A comparison of health beliefs and behaviours of clients of 
orthodox and complementary medicine” (1993) 32:2 British Journal of Clinical Psychology at 49. 
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medicine.3 In his writing, he includes many other reasons which pertain to either of these 
categories as well as those which fall under both, collectively. Warren finds that some 
individuals prefer alternative therapies for the sole reason that they can exercise a greater 
degree of control over their health and care.  
The existing psychological literature effectively presents the various reasons behind an 
individual’s decision to use alternative medicine for their personal healing as compared to 
allopathic medicine. It also explains the rights that children have to decide for themselves 
and have dignity over their own bodies while also discussing parental autonomy over 
deciding what is best for their child. However, many questions remain unanswered and 
topics remain untouched. It appears there is a growing fad which is turning people towards 
holistic healing over allopathic medicines for reasons which vary, as discussed by multiple 
authors. It is crucial to determine where to draw the line; when should cultural, religious, 
or other external influences of a parent no longer apply to decisions made for their children? 
I argue that a bright line should be drawn when otherwise acceptable religious beliefs 
interfere with the child’s medical treatment so significantly that the child’s overall well-
being is jeopardized. 
The purpose of this major research project is to provide clarity about the conflicted 
moral and legal argument behind the conviction of parents who, in a criminally negligent 
manner, fail to protect their children. I will consider the provisions of the Canadian 
Criminal Code, particularly section 215 (failing to provide the necessaries of life) and 
section 222(5)(b) (criminal negligence causing death) and explain how I believe they ought 
 
3 Salmon, J Warren. Alternative medicines: popular and policy perspectives, ed (New York: 
Tavistock Publ., 1985) at 191. 
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to be applied to these cases. In my view how we determine the fault or culpability in these 
cases is debatable and subject to how morality is understood. To that end, a variety of 
arguments favouring convictions will be explored through a detailed look into relevant 
cases. 
My purpose in this paper is to clarify the dichotomy between the institution of law and 
the inscrutable values of religious belief, and to investigate what happens when they 
collide, and individuals commit acts resulting in the deaths of vulnerable children. The task 
of discerning whether parents who withhold medical treatment should be held criminally 
liable for harm or death caused by their conduct is a difficult task that this study aims to 
make clearer. I hope that this project will have predictive utility to make an accurate 
prediction of how future deaths of children of criminally negligent parents could be handled 
in Canadian courts. Although conclusions cannot be made with certainty, a bright line rule 
can be proposed to deal with these sorts of cases. This proposed rule will allow for the 
defence of mistake of fact to be available in principle although the claim would not be able 
to rest on the claim that the mistake was based on a religious belief, or faith in alternative 
medicine. 
My discussion proceeds as follows. First, I will ask whether an honest and reasonable 
belief in the healing power of religion should exculpate an accused parent from liability in 
cases of criminal negligence causing death. And second, I will inquire into the extent to 
which the criminal law can make exceptions, if any, for individuals with religious beliefs 
in cases involving objective fault offences. My thesis is the defence of mistake of fact 
should not be available in cases of criminal negligence causing death where the parents 
cause the death of their child. I argue that when there is good evidence that a child’s health 
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or wellbeing are being negatively affected but the parents continue to pursue treatment 
based on their religious beliefs, their conduct is criminally negligent.  
My animating question is the following: do the actions of such parents in withholding 
medical treatment from their children show wanton or reckless disregard for the safety and 
lives of their children? Put simply, do such parents depart “markedly and substantially” 
from the required standard of a reasonably prudent person? An additional question is the 
following: are their actions/omissions enough to sentence perpetrators to the maximum 
penalty instead of the low-range sentences that have typically been given in the past? My 
answer is that they do depart from the required standard of a reasonably prudent person, 
that when their failure to provide their child with medical help causes their child’s death 
they should be convicted under section 222(5)(b) for criminal negligence causing death, a 
form of manslaughter, and that they should be required to serve longer sentences than they 
currently do. 
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2. Fault Elements and Penal Negligence 
Having considered the possible reasons behind the decision to choose alternative 
medicine over western medicine, or completely rely on a superior power to heal a child, let 
us discuss the legal implications of these decisions. In our free and democratic society, we 
are granted certain Charter rights and freedoms to the extent that they do not interfere with 
or affect another individual’s rights and freedoms. Therefore, where a parent makes a 
medical decision for a child that infringes the child’s right to life, such actions are 
punishable by the law.  
To date, faith healing and the use of alternative medicine continue to be prosecuted 
under two statutory heads in the Criminal Code of Canada, namely: section 215 (failing to 
provide the necessaries of life) and section 222(5)(b) (criminal negligence causing death). 
Criminal negligence causing death is a more serious offence than the failure to provide 
necessaries because a person guilty of the former has caused the death of another human 
being whereas one found guilty of the latter has at best exposed another human being to 
risk of harm.   
Section 215 of the Code imposes a duty on parents to, among other things, provide 
the necessaries of life to their dependents. When prosecuted as an indictable offence the 
maximum sentence is five years, while the maximum sentence for a summary offence is 
eighteen months. The prescribed range gives the Crown discretion to proceed based on the 
moral blameworthiness of the accused’s actions.4 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada outline the 
 
4 The range between indictable offence and summary offence also gives the accused the choice 
between being tried in a provincial Magistrate’s Court by a judge alone or in a Superior Court of 
Court of Queen’s Bench by a jury. See Kent Roach, Essentials of Canadian Law, 2nd ed (Toronto, 
ON: Irwin Law, 2004) at 25. 
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duty placed upon parents, guardians and spouses to provide the necessaries of life to their 
dependants, in accordance with the Criminal Code. The duty to provide the necessaries of 
life has been elucidated under section 215(1)(a) of the Criminal Code: “everyone is under 
a legal duty as a parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a family, to provide necessaries 
of life for a child under the age of sixteen years”.5  
The provision does not give guidance on what exactly constitutes ‘necessaries’ of 
life’. Section 215(1) imposes a duty and, further, section 215(2) clarifies what happens 
when a person fails to meet the imposed duty. Generally, an offence is only committed 
under section 215(2) if the breach of duty under section 215(1) involves a person in 
necessitous circumstances, or where there is risk of harm to that person. The definition of 
“necessaries of life” in Halsbury’s Laws of Canada extends beyond the necessaries to 
preserve life to include medical aid. The courts have amplified the meaning of these 
provisions by including food, shelter, clothing and medical treatment, all of which are 
considered necessaries tending to preserve life.6 The act of knowingly withholding 
medication, or a prescribed medical treatment, would fit well into this description.7 This 
would lead to a conviction of criminal negligence causing death if the failure to meet the 
duty rose to the level of a marked and substantial departure and that the failure or omission 
caused the death of another human being. The essential elements of the offence constituting 
the failure to provide necessaries of life includes: 
 
5 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 215(1)(a). 
6 See R. v. Brooks, (1902) 5 C.C.C. 372 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Lewis, (1903) 7 C.C.C. 261 (Ont. C.A.). 
7 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 220. 
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1) proof of legal duty to provide necessaries of life to be determined by 
circumstances 
2) failure to perform the duty must be with respect to a person in destitute or 
necessitous circumstances or failure to endanger life of the person to whom the duty 
is owed/cause of person to be permanently endangered.  
Ill minor children are considered as persons in necessitous circumstances and any 
omission to provide them with the necessary care could permanently endanger their lives. 
Thus, any parent who fails to provide their child, to whom the duty is owed, with any 
necessary care and fits the description under section 215, would be punishable under 
section 222(5)(b) if that failure causes the death of their child and if that failure rises to the 
level of criminal negligence. This has been clarified by Fish J. in R. v. J. (F.):8 To be 
charged with a failure to provide the necessaries of life to a person dependent on the 
accused, the following must be satisfied: the accused’s 
“failure to protect the child [must have] contributed to the child's death and (2) a 
reasonable parent in the same circumstances would have foreseen that failing to 
protect [the child] would cause the child's health to be endangered permanently.”9 
 As mentioned earlier, section 215 and the failure to provide necessaries of life is a 
distinct offence from section 222(5)(b) criminal negligence causing death. However, a 
failure under section 215 can lead to a charge under section 222(5)(b). This makes it 
important to discuss the former to develop an understanding of the connection between the 
 
8 [2008] 3 S.C.R. 215. 
9 Ibid at para 25. 
8 
 
 
 
two charges. So far, I have discussed the elements constituting an offence under section 
215. I will continue to examine this provision further to delve into what is meant by a 
marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person. Also, 
what the standard for a reasonably prudent person is and how an individualized approach 
can affect the process. 
Section 215 extends to include behaviour that is meant to be punished as a marked 
and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent parent where a risk to 
life is foreseeable at the failure to provide necessaries of life. This section only requires a 
marked departure, since it is an offence of penal negligence rather than criminal negligence. 
In some cases, however, the failure to provide the duty is so aggravated that it rises to the 
level of criminally negligence conduct. The trial judge in R. v. J. (F.)10 stated that the 
approach to assessing the foreseeability should be from the standpoint not from what the 
respondent foresaw, objectively, from the perspective of what a reasonable parent in 
identical circumstances could foresee. Consideration must be placed on whether there was 
a discernible risk of more than a short-lived bodily harm to a child which a reasonable 
parent in like circumstances would have appreciated and taken steps to prevent.11 This 
applies to charges of failure to provide necessaries and criminal negligence.  
The description for a punishable marked departure is conduct that does not meet 
the standard of a reasonably prudent person. There are three possible standards: a failure 
to meet the reasonable person standard which is not criminal but gives rise to liability for 
a public welfare offence; a failure to meet the reasonable person standard that constitutes a 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid at para 30. 
9 
 
 
 
marked departure from the standard, which is penal negligence; and failure to meet the 
reasonable person standard that constitutes a marked and substantial departure, which is 
criminal negligence. The importance of distinguishing between these standards is 
elucidated in R. v. Beatty: 
“if every departure from the civil norm is to be criminalized, regardless of the 
degree, we risk casting the net too widely and branding as criminals persons who 
are in reality not morally blameworthy.”12 
Furthermore, the higher standard to meet the standard for criminal negligence has 
been highlighted by Kent Roach in Essentials of Criminal Law:  
“Section 7 of the Charter has been interpreted to require more than simple or civil 
negligence , but rather a “marked departure from the standards of a reasonable 
person” in order to convict a person of a criminal offence based on objective 
fault.”13 
Let us dissect that term further to clarify the broad description of a person that 
would be considered to be reasonably prudent.  An extensive summary of the character of 
the reasonable person is found in Arland v. Taylor14:  
He is a person of normal intelligence who makes prudence a guide to his conduct. 
He does nothing that a prudent man would not do and does not omit to do anything 
a prudent man would do. He acts in accord with general and approved practice. His 
conduct is guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human 
 
12 2008 SCC 5 at para. 34. 
13 Kent Roach, Essentials of Canadian Law, 6th ed (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2015) at 75. 
14 Arland v. Taylor (1955), [1955] O.R. 131 (Ont. C.A.). 
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affairs. His conduct is the standard 'adopted in the community by persons of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence'.15 
 
 To meet the standard of a reasonable person requires, by law, a minimum level of 
performance. There is no expectation of perfection or extraordinary judgment and the 
standard allows for the consideration of accidents and errors in judgment.16 Since every 
human mind has its own way of rationalizing and making decisions, any blunt rule or 
standard would expect humans to also operate robotically.  
Lamer C.J. argued in support of a personalized approach when factoring in 
age/youth, lack of experience etc. for a mother who failed to provide the necessities of life 
to a child in Naglik. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, rejected this individualized 
or personalized approach in Creighton where the majority accepted that only certain 
characteristics of an individual could establish incapacity, thereby exculpating the accused. 
McLachlin J., for example, said that  
“The question is what the reasonably prudent person would have done in all the 
circumstances.  Thus a welder who lights a torch causing an explosion may be 
excused if he has made an enquiry and been given advice upon which he was 
reasonably entitled to rely, that there was no explosive gas in the area.”17 
In Tutton v. Tutton, McIntyre J. stated that criminal negligence requires “proof of 
conduct which reveals a marked and significant departure from the standard which could 
 
15 Ibid. See also CED 2nd (online) Negligence, “Elements of Cause of Action: Standard of Care: 
The Reasonable Person” (II.4.(a).(i)). 
16 Sigerseth v. Pederson (1927), [1927] S.C.R. 342 (S.C.C.). 
17 Ibid. 
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be expected of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances” as opposed to simple 
negligence. It is required to prove more than mere negligence.18 The court held that proving 
negligence would not suffice rather, it must be explicitly recognized that the accused had 
failed to do what the reasonable person would have done. The same was explained in R. v. 
Hundal19: in context of Criminal Code offences, the Supreme Court indicated that there 
must be at a minimum a “marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe in the accused’s situation”. The court unanimously accepted this 
position that the “test for [penal] negligence is an objective one requiring a marked 
departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person”20. Whenever the reasonableness 
standard is encountered to a Criminal Code offence, courts must require a proof of at least 
a marked or gross departure from the norm. 
The discussion above endorses McLachlin J.’s view from R. v. Creighton that an 
objective standard – such as the standard in penal or criminal negligence – does not take 
into account personal characteristics except where those characteristics are relevant to the 
accused’s capacity to appreciate the risks that his or her conduct was imposing on others.  
My argument to this point has been that the objective standard to determine a 
marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person is, 
indeed, a more suitable approach than the individualized approach otherwise proposed. 
What I would like to do now is shift the focus from section 215 onto the second statutory 
head, and the more serious, section 222(5)(b) which outlines the provisions for criminal 
 
18 Kent Roach, Essentials of Canadian Law, 2nd ed (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2004) at 140. 
19 (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97. 
20 Ibid at para. 108. 
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negligence manslaughter. I will further articulate the requirements for objective fault and 
explain what it means to depart from the standard of a reasonably prudent person. 
The broader charge, manslaughter, is constructed negatively under section 234 of 
the Code, which defines it as “culpable homicide that is not murder or infanticide is 
manslaughter”. Therefore, death that is caused by criminal negligence can either give rise 
to a charge under section 220, criminal negligence causing death, or section 222(5)(b), 
criminal negligence manslaughter. Though these are offences are divided under two 
statutory heads, their fault elements are identical.21 So, what is criminal negligence? 
Section 219(1)(b) of the Criminal Code defines criminal negligence as wanton or reckless 
disregard for the lives or safety of other persons: “everyone is criminally negligent who (a) 
in doing anything, or (b) omitting to do anything that it is duty to do, shows wanton or 
reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.” An exact definition has not been 
provided for the terms “wanton” and “reckless” as they are sui generis concepts.22  
McIntyre J. stated in R. v. Tutton, 
The plain and ordinary meaning of the terms "wanton" and "reckless" when used in 
connection with the concept of negligence would seem to include a state of being 
heedless of apparent danger. Section 202(1) does not use the term "reckless" as an 
 
21 Arbour J. stated in R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 SCR 90 that section 222(5)(b), read in conjunction 
with section 234 makes clear that the offence of criminal negligence causing death is a type of 
manslaughter. She further stated at para. 62 that: “The circumstances of this case palpably 
demonstrate the overlap: the accused was initially charged with manslaughter and there is nothing 
in the record that explains why he was committed for trial on the charge of criminal negligence 
causing death rather than on the original charge of manslaughter.  Nothing turns on this since the 
two are totally interchangeable.”   
22 Parliament has also not defined fault elements such as “purposely”, “reckless”, or “negligently” 
or specified which fault elements applies to each offence; Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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extended definition of intention or malice, but rather employs the term as part of a 
definition of conduct which amounts to "negligence" in a criminal context.23 
Then, does wanton or reckless disregard make withholding the necessaries of life 
worse? Where parents choose faith healing or alternative medicine, I assume they are aware 
of potential side effects that could put their child’s life at risk – it is difficult to view this 
as anything other than wanton and reckless. Though there may be cases in which no visible 
signs of deterioration of health exist to indicate to a parent that their prayers are not 
working, it is still unreasonable to ignore medical treatment where it is available. Hence, 
their ignorance of medical treatment or failure to seek medical advice displays a wanton 
and reckless disregard for the health and safety of their child. Where the parent is 
subjectively reckless about their child’s safety and death ensues, this should suffice for 
criminal liability under criminal negligence. The cases in which parents may not be 
subjectively reckless furthers our discussion into another direction which I have delved 
deeper into in section 4 of this paper. To hold someone criminally liable for a negligent 
action that caused harm to another, it needs to be proven that the accused had a fair 
opportunity to have chosen a different course of action but failed to do so, unreasonably.24  
To sum things up thus far, I have stated the fault elements under section 215 and 
220 that discuss the failure to provide necessaries of life and criminal negligence 
manslaughter. The standard of a reasonably prudent person, together with what constitutes 
a marked and substantial departure from the same and what it means to display wanton or 
reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other people have been covered thus far. I have 
 
23 R. v. Tutton, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 at para 43. 
24 Wasserstrom, Richard A. “H. L. A. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and Criminal 
Responsibility.” (1967) 35 University of Chicago LR 1 at pp. 92-126.  
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also accepted that the Supreme Court of Canada was correct in applying the objective 
approach to criminal negligence in Tutton and Creighton. However, whether the Tuttons’ 
belief was reasonable, is questionable and will be discussed later on in this project. The 
following are examples of parents and guardians of children who were charged with 
criminal negligence manslaughter for the death of a minor in their care. These cases 
demonstrate the presence of the required elements for a charge under section 2222(5)(b). 
Though these are not cases of faith-healing deaths, they are relevant for a basic 
understanding of a fact pattern that would lay a charge of criminal negligence 
manslaughter. This understanding will develop throughout this project to narrow the 
application of this provision down specifically to faith-healing deaths.  
In the summer of 2003, Dominic Martin of Verdun, Quebec was dropping off his 
twenty three-month old daughter Audrey at day care.25 He agreed with his wife, who was 
in a hurry to get to work, to drop her off first then proceed to Audrey’s day care. However, 
after dropping his wife off, he drove on and parked in his usual park’n ride location to 
embark on his transit commute to work. His daughter was sound asleep in the backseat, 
strapped responsibly in her child seat. Upon returning at the end of the day, he found his 
daughter unconscious. She was rushed to the hospital but died a few hours later of heat 
exhaustion. Martin was charged with criminal negligence manslaughter to which he pled 
not guilty. The charges were dropped by the crown citing insufficient evidence to sustain 
the criminal charge.  
 
25  “Father Charged in Baby’s Death,” CBC News, (18 July 2003), online: 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/father-charged-in-baby-s-death-1.379179> 
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In a similar case, Leslie MacDonald was to drop her grandson, Max, off at daycare 
after picking him up from her daughter’s house. She was tired after a long night shift and 
drove home to sleep. Later that evening, she drove to the day care to pick up her grandson 
when she realized that she had forgotten her grandson in the backseat of her car. Max was 
rushed to the hospital by paramedics but was pronounced dead due to heat exhaustion and 
hyperthermia. MacDonald was charged with criminal negligence manslaughter and failure 
to provide the necessaries of life. Her fate was different than that of Dominic Martin as she 
pled guilty to the lesser offence of failing to provide the necessaries of life. The more 
serious charge of manslaughter was dropped.26  
All civilians in Canada have the right to be protected from injury or physical 
endangerment by another individuals’ wanton or reckless disregard for their lives or safety. 
This right is held in rem, against the society at large. Thus, society owes a correlative duty 
to not put other lives at risk. An omission to discharge a positive duty can display a wanton 
or reckless disregard towards those to whom the duty of care is owed can also evoke a 
charge of criminal negligence. Additionally, children protected by these rights are owed 
for the additional duty of being cared for in a manner absent of wanton or reckless 
disregard. 
The ultimate goal of the criminal law is to have criminally negligent parents receive 
their legal due, not more but for the sake of needlessly dead children, not less. I will argue 
 
26 Kaleigh Rogers, “Grandmother Charged In Death Of Milton, Ont. Toddler Left Alone In Hot 
Car” The Globe and Mail (5 July 2013) online: 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/grandmother-charged-in-death-of-milton-ont-
toddler-left-alone-in-hot-car/article13019696/#:~:text=A-
,Grandmother%20charged%20in%20death%20of%20Milton%2C%20Ont.%2C%20toddler,left%
20alone%20in%20hot%20car&text=Maximus%20Huyskens%20was%20in%20the,heat%20strok
e%20on%20June%2026.> 
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that such parents culpably commit homicide while failing to provide the necessaries of life, 
and that they departed markedly and substantially from the required standard. Convictions 
must be morally and legally justifiable though they need not be characterized by moral 
certainty which is a luxury rarely afforded by cases involving criminal negligence. 
 This section discussed the fault elements of section 215, failure to provide the 
necessaries of life, and section 222(5)(b) criminal negligence manslaughter. There are 
many complex concepts that apply to criminal negligence cases alike but are complicated 
somewhat when applying them to cases involving faith healings.  The next section 
investigates the fault requirements for criminal negligence specifically determining 
whether a subjective or objective approach is appropriate to deal with these cases.  
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3. The Fault Requirement for Criminal Negligence 
 The ancient Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not 
become guilty unless the mind is guilty) displays the belief that where a crime contains a 
visible element, it also carries a mental component. In criminal law, the fundamental 
principle is that there should be no responsibility without personal fault. The Supreme 
Court of Canada asserted a fault requirement as a matter of constitutional imperative under 
section 7 of the Charter27 in Reference re Section 94(2) of Motor vehicle Act (B.C.)28 and 
as a matter of fundamental common law principle in City of Sault Ste Marie29. Since there 
is a constitutional requirement of fault for offences threatening liberty interests, the 
remaining question is what the fault requirement entails. There is substantial ambiguity 
about definition; the central issue continues to be whether to follow a subjective or 
objective approach.  
The Supreme Court judgment in Creighton30 made a clear distinction between the 
subjective standard of whether the accused was actually aware of a risk and the objective 
standard of whether the accused failed to measure up to the external standard of the 
reasonable person, irrespective of awareness.31 The dilemma between which test would be 
appropriate in cases of criminal negligence manslaughter for parents causing the death of 
their children was discussed in detail in the case of the Tuttons. 
 
27 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice. 
28 Motor Vehicle Amendment Act, 1982, 1982 (B.C.), c. 36. 
29 [1978] 2 SCR 1299. 
30 (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 189 (S.C.C.). 
31 Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 7th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014). 
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R. v. Tutton32  
The respondents in this case belonged to the religious sect of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
which believes in faith healing. They were the parents of a five-year-old diabetic child, 
Christopher. They believed that a divine power could perform miracles to cure ailments in 
response to prayers. Their religious beliefs did not prevent them from seeking medical 
advice, nor taking medicine. However, they did believe that the Lord could cure ailments 
that were beyond the purview of medical science. The primary concern of the parents was 
to cure Christopher’s diabetes and to relieve him from the necessity of taking insulin for 
life. They claimed to find support for their reliance on faith healing in the Bible, and it was 
conceded that they were both sincere in their beliefs. In October, 1980, Mrs. Tutton ceased 
administering insulin because she firmly and honestly believed Christopher had been 
healed by the power of the Lord, that is, she genuinely believed Christopher was not in 
danger of dying. His health immediately began to decline and was rushed to a local 
hospital. There, the tending doctor informed the Tuttons that failing to administer insulin 
could have possible fatal consequences. The doctor had obtained assurances from them that 
they would not withhold insulin in the future. About a year later in October of 1981, Mrs. 
Tutton received a vision from God informing her that her son had been cured of diabetes 
and no longer required any insulin medication. A few days later, they found their son not 
breathing and was pronounced dead on arrival.33  
Arthur Tutton and Carol Tutton had educated themselves on the implications of 
diabetes and tried to understand the issue as accurately as possible. They did not withhold 
 
32 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 
33 Ibid at para 35. 
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any other form of medical care from Christopher, but in relation to his diabetic condition, 
they believed that God would intervene. 
The respondents were charged with causing their son’s death by criminal 
negligence through omitting to provide him the necessaries of life without lawful excuse, 
thereby committing manslaughter. They raised the defence of honest mistake of fact which 
would render their conduct non-culpable. They were convicted of manslaughter and 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada which set aside the conviction and directed new 
trials on the basis that the trial judge failed to explain to the jury that the statutory reverse 
onus of proving the lawful excuse was to be applied only to the offence of failing to provide 
necessaires of life, not to the charge of manslaughter.34 The court also held that a subjective 
awareness of risk was required, rather than the usual test of a marked and substantial 
departure from the objective norm.35 There was doubt whether the case was of an omission 
on the part of the parents or the commission of an act that evokes criminal liability. It was 
determined that the fault element required for an offence would be the same for a 
commission and omission. On the test of fault of criminal negligence, the court was divided 
as to whether the test should be subjective or objective. 
The debate in this case focused on the mental requirement of criminal negligence. 
In the subjectivist view, a “true” and serious crime requires subjective fault for a 
conviction.36 According to Wilson J.,  
 
34 Supra note 32. 
35 Ibid. 
36 One of the categories of offences recognized in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 
(1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353. 
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“[T]he words of the section can reasonably bear an interpretation which leaves 
room for the mental element of awareness or advertence to a risk to the lives or safety 
of others or wilful blindness to such risk.  Conduct which shows a wanton or reckless 
disregard for the lives and safety of others will by its nature constitute prima 
facie evidence of the mental element, and in the absence of some evidence that casts 
doubt on the normal degree of mental awareness, proof of the act and reference to 
what a reasonable person in the circumstances must have realized will lead to a 
conclusion that the accused was aware of the risk or wilfully blind to the risk.”37 
The objectivist response to this argument is that criminal negligence differs in 
degree from civil negligence that is a greater departure from the standard of care expected 
from a reasonable person. Where there is an agreement on the fundamental matter, there 
remains a debate on how subjective the subjective fault is and the extent to which the 
objective view is ameliorated by considerations unique to the accused persons.38 The 
Supreme Court members who took part in the judgment were split evenly on the subjective-
objective debate. McIntyre J. reasoned that criminal negligence is not an ordinary mens rea 
offence and therefore concluded that an objective test is required.39 McIntyre J. stated40:  
in choosing the test to be applied in assessing conduct under section 202 of the 
criminal code, it must be observed at once that what is made criminal is negligence. 
Negligence connotes the opposite of thought-directed action. In other words, its 
 
37 Supra note 32. 
38 MacKinnon, P. “Criminal law - criminal negligence and recklessness - criminal law reform: The 
Queen v. Tutton; Waite v. The Queen” (1990) Canadian Bar Review 69:1 at 177. 
39 The Court of Appeal accepted the objective test to be generally applicable while also concluding 
that a subjective test would be required where the charges are based on acts of omission, distinct 
from those of commission.  
40 Supra note 32 at pp 1429-30. 
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existence precludes the element of positive intent to achieve a given result. This 
leads to the conclusion that what is sought to be restrained by punishment under 
section 202 of the code is conduct, and its results. What is punished, in other words, 
is not the state of mind but the consequences of mindless action”41 and a conviction 
is justified where there has been a “marked and significant” departure from the 
standard of conduct expected from a reasonable person.42 
According to McIntyre, introducing subjective elements into objective standards 
creates the risk of being underinclusive as subjective elements result in a lowering of the 
objective standard of liability dependent on certain characteristics. They also risk being 
underinclusive for the accused who have idiosyncrasies that are not articulated ex ante into 
the limited list of personal characteristics that are implanted in the objective standard. 
McIntyre J. listed characteristics that would not lower the harshness of the application of 
an objective standard for a driver who drove in a reckless manner which displayed a wanton 
disregard for the lives and safety of others. It would not matter that the driver was unable 
to wilfully blind himself or herself to the prohibited risk; this conduct would in itself breach 
the objective standard.  
If a religious or spiritual belief can be used as an excuse, why not a belief of 
excessive self-confidence or mere ignorance? The Tuttons were educated about the risk 
and complications of Christopher’s diabetic condition and were warned by doctors to not 
withdraw insulin; therefore it is my conclusion that their belief in a divine cure should not 
excuse. They had taken medical advice and knew that withdrawal of insulin would have 
 
41 Ibid. at para 1430. 
42 Ibid at para 1431.  
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serious consequence. The ignorance of a parent towards medical advice and the excessive 
self-confidence to make their own decisions should not lawfully be excused. 
The purpose of section 222(5)(b) would be defeated if it required that the accused’s 
intention be separately proven because intentional conduct would inevitably be considered 
under other sections of the Code. Section 222(5)(b) aims at mindless but socially dangerous 
conduct. The test is of reasonableness; only proof of conduct revealing a marked and 
substantial departure from the standard expected from a reasonably prudent person will 
justify a conviction of criminal negligence.  
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4. Can Parents Use the Defence of Honest Belief in the context of Criminal 
Negligence?   
To elaborate on the defence of mistaken belief, Dubin J.A. in Tutton stated in the 
Ontario Court of Appeal that the Crown must establish that the accused omitted to provide 
Christopher with insulin without lawful excuse. A lawful excuse in this case may have been 
that the person did not have the funds to purchase insulin or that due to a personal or 
physical incapacity was unable to obtain the medication, or did not know how to administer 
it. My claim is that religious beliefs are never a lawful excuse in cases involving faith-
healing deaths. It is never reasonable to claim, for example, that insulin or other medication 
or treatment was not administered because the accused were of the view that God told them 
that such medication or treatment was not required. 
Though mistake of fact is a recognized and lawful excuse in some cases, mistaken 
belief based on sincerely held religious beliefs should not be recognized as an excuse in 
objective fault offences because the persons purposely followed such beliefs in ignorance 
of other options. By this I mean, religions are generally, voluntarily followed. There is 
usually no forceful compliance and the parents in all the cases discussed in this study 
portray the minimum cognizance required in executing the standard of a reasonable person.  
In Pappajohn v. Queen43, clarifications were made regarding the defence of mistake 
of fact in cases of sexual assault. Although this interpretation applies to subjective fault 
offences and does not necessarily assist in reaching a definite conclusion for objective fault 
offences, it is still useful to discuss. In this case, Dickson J. makes clear that a belief must 
 
43 (1980), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 14 C.R. (3d) 243, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, 111 D.L.R. (3d) 1. 
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be honest where the fault element is subjective. However, because criminal negligence 
causing death is an objective fault offence, it stands to reason that in order to exculpate a 
mistaken factual belief must be both honest and reasonable. A mistake of fact is a negation 
of guilty intention instead of an affirmation of a positive defence; it avails an accused who 
acts innocently, pursuant to a flawed perception of the facts and nonetheless commits the 
actus reus of an offence.44 There is a requirement that the mistake to excuse be both honest 
and reasonable in cases of criminal negligence. The accused may only raise the defence of 
mistake of fact where the mistake is reasonable; the burden of proving such a mistake lies 
upon the accused.45 I argue that in cases of death caused by criminal negligence an appeal 
to religious beliefs cannot be reasonable especially where there are obvious signs of 
deterioration of health and other medical assistance is available.  
Where the parent has reason to believe that their child is ill, has been told by doctors 
that their child is ill, and has been instructed to follow a certain treatment or the child will 
die, the mistaken belief that God will cure the child’s illness is unreasonable and so cannot 
be relied on. However, the difficult question arises where there are no visible signs of 
illness, doctors are unaware of any illness nor have they instructed any treatment. In that 
sort of case, can a parent rely on their honest but mistaken belief that God will intervene to 
heal the child? My answer to this is quite simple. Where the parent is unaware of their 
child’s illness, there is no reason for them to believe that God will heal where there is 
nothing to be healed. What is the belief healing? It would not be logical for the parent to 
pray for an illness that they do not believe exists. Therefore, to raise the defence of an 
 
44 Ibid at para 261. 
45 Manning, Mewett & Sankoff, Criminal Law, 5th Ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2015) 
at 47. 
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honest and reasonable mistake where their child dies due to negligence on the parent’s part 
seems to be an easy way exculpate the consequences.  
I consider the facts of of R. v. Stephan46 to clarify my argument. In this case, the 
parents were aware of the signs and symptoms of meningitis, none of which were displayed 
by their child. They were concerned and vigilantly monitoring the child’s health for any 
serious symptoms. The physical evidence established that the child’s death occurred due 
to a deprivation of oxygen caused by laryngotracheobronchitic complications, and not from 
meningitis. The parents had initially been charged with the failure to provide necessaries 
of life, of which they were later acquitted. In this case, if the parents had raised the defence 
of an honest but mistaken belief, what would be the basis of the belief? Would they be 
praying for their child to be healed of meningitis or the underlying illness they were 
unaware of? To reiterate my argument, faith-healing cannot exist where there is no illness 
to heal. If the parents are unaware of their child’s illness because the child has not displayed 
any visible symptoms, the parents would not honestly and reasonably be praying for that 
specific illness, for which they would be charged. Therefore, in the case of Stephan, and 
alike, the defence of mistake of fact should not be available.  
I now turn back to the discussion of what is required before an accused can rely on 
the defence of mistake of fact. The Crown, in the Tuttons’ case, was required to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was the duty of the Tuttons to provide their son with the 
necessaries of life, which happened to be daily insulin injections. The Crown needed prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Tuttons failed to do without a lawful excuse47, that they 
 
46 2019 ABQB 715. 
47 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 215(2).  
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showed wanton or reckless disregard for his safety, and that their omission caused his 
death.48 
Both the Supreme Court and Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that a new trial was 
needed. The Tuttons’ claim was that Christ revealed Himself and announced that insulin 
injections are no longer required, subsequently causing their son to become seriously ill. 
Though the Tuttons claimed they held an honest and reasonable belief that their child had 
miraculously been cured, I still argue that a belief in ignorance of medical advice is 
unreasonable. As mentioned earlier, a subjective fault element is not required in objective 
fault offences. Since this case is one of objective fault, even in the absence of subjective 
fault, a punishable wrong has been committed. 
The words of section 202 (now 219) of the Code clearly indicate that a person is 
criminally negligent who in omitting to do the duty that is his to do shows wanton or 
reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. In such cases, an objective test 
must be employed where criminal negligence is considered to be the conduct of the 
accused, as opposed to his mental state or intention.49 
R. v. Aitkian50 
The defence of honest belief was raised in Tutton and thoroughly explained in 
Aitkian. The Ontario Court of Justice clarified reasons why this defence cannot be used in 
cases involving criminal negligence manslaughter. In this case, the parents of a 17-month-
old infant girl were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life, without lawful 
 
48 R. v. Tutton, [1985] O.J. No. 44 at para 335.  
49 Ibid at para. 45. 
50 R. v. Aitkian, [1992] O.J. No. 3045 (ONCJ). 
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excuse, and thereby causing the death of their child. Their daughter died from malnutrition 
and bronchial pneumonia. The parents presented the defence that they had an honest belief 
they were providing their child with the required necessaries. The mother had been getting 
various treatments from an herbalist prior to the birth of their daughter, and during 
pregnancy. Upon her birth, the herbalist predicted the child to be strong and healthy. A few 
months later, the mother refused the advice of a paediatrician to have the child immunized 
and continued following the advice of the herbalist regarding the care and needs of the 
child. After 11-months of being breast-fed and thriving, the child developed a rash that 
caused to wither and die. The herbalist had persuaded the parents that the visible changes 
in the child’s health were part of a healing process. They were convinced that getting 
medical attention would be equivalent to “putting a gun to her head”. Both parents were 
convicted at the initial trial but successfully approach and a new trial was ordered.51   
The position of the accused was that they genuinely believed in the nutritional and 
health care advice of the herbalist despite the visibly deteriorating health of the child. The 
defence was supported by extensive evidence on the good character and good parenting of 
the accused. The photographic evidence of the pathologist depicted the progressive 
deterioration of the child until death by starvation. It validated that it is inconceivable that 
 
51 Ibid. The trials proceeded on the basis of information received from the child’s father that he had 
asked his wife to call the police at 1:30 p.m. and the child’s death occurred between 2:35 and 2:50. 
However, evidence tendered at all three trial proved that the 911 call was made at 2:48 p.m., leaving 
a difference of over an hour before the police was contacted. The police did not disclose that the 
male was mistaken about the time he had the conversation with his wife; the disclosure was made 
during the fifth week of the third trial. The accused was denied a fair trial in both the first and 
second trial. They were prejudiced as a result of their inability to make full answers and defence 
due to the Crown’s inability to disclose such a significant piece of information. Then J. determined 
that fair play and decency was disproportionate to the public interest in continuing the trial; the 
indictment against both accused was stayed as an abuse of process.  
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parents who observed the progressive deterioration of the child could have honestly 
believed they were providing the child with the necessary care.  
As mentioned earlier in this section, in order to exculpate, a mistaken factual belief 
must be honest and reasonable in criminal negligence cases. Where there are obvious signs 
that a child’s health is deteriorating, it is difficult to label the belief as one that is honest 
and reasonable. Relating back to the standard of a reasonably prudent person, a prudent 
parent would be able to detect such blatant signs of deterioration. Therefore, in criminal 
negligence cases, where the mistake of fact is unreasonable and even dishonest, the defence 
should not be allowed. 
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5.  The Tuttons’ Conception of Indifference  
A term used repeatedly when discussing the charge of criminal negligence 
manslaughter is “recklessness”. Merriam-Webster simply defines the term as a lack of 
proper caution or careless of consequences.52 In legal terms, it carries quite a complex 
understanding. The application of this term varies depending on the offence, whether it is 
objective or subjective.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal adopted a version of recklessness in the form of 
indifference in Tutton. The Court held that recklessness is a constituent element of criminal 
negligence. It was held in F.(J.) that where the jury is not satisfied that the parents displayed 
a wanton and reckless disregard for the safety of their life, they would be required to acquit 
the accused of the crime of manslaughter. Recklessness does not directly translate to an 
indifference to risk. So, were the Tuttons reckless in their decision to withdraw insulin? 
McIntyre J. quotes himself from Sansregret v. The Queen53 in Tutton in support of 
the objectivist approach: 
“I expressed the view that “recklessness, to form a part of the criminal mens rea, 
must have an element of the subjective".  I then went on to say that, "[i]t is in this 
sense that the term `recklessness' is used in the criminal law and it is clearly distinct 
from the concept of civil negligence... [I]t is in this sense that the term ̀ recklessness' 
is used in the criminal law and it is clearly distinct from the concept of civil 
negligence.  It was argued upon the basis of these words and later comments on the 
nature of negligence in relation to the criminal law that a subjective test should 
 
52 Webster, Noah. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Pocket Books, 1977. 
53 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 at pp. 581-82. 
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therefore be applied in considering the existence of criminal negligence under s. 
202 of the Code.  I would reject that argument on the basis that the concept of 
recklessness there described is not applicable in a case under s. 202 of the 
Code.  Sansregret was charged with rape, a crime which involves positive mind-
directed conduct on the part of the accused which aims at the accomplishment of a 
specific result.  It is a traditional mens rea offence and a mental state must be 
proved, in that case an intention to persist with his purpose despite the fact that the 
complainant's consent has been extorted by threats and fear.  Recklessness on his 
part forms a part of the mens rea (the blameworthy state of mind) and has to be 
proved on a subjective basis as part of the mental element of the offence.  In this 
sense, the words in Sansregret v. The Queen are apposite.  Section 202, on the other 
hand, has created a separate offence;   an offence which makes negligence -- the 
exhibition of wanton or reckless behaviour -- a crime in itself and has thus defined 
its own terms.  As noted by Cory J.A. in R. v. Waite, s. 202 of the Code was enacted 
in its present form as a codification of the offence which had emerged in Canadian 
jurisprudence, and in respect of which the necessary mens rea may be inferred on 
an objective basis from the acts of the accused.”54 
The question is not whether the crime had also been portrayed in the mind of the 
perpetrator.  Rather, the question is whether, regardless of the images that transpired in the 
actor’s consciousness, he or she can be blamed for committing the unlawful and wrongful 
act. This approach is evaluative instead of descriptive. The wrongful act is not attributed to 
the actor solely based on particular facts but on the basis of social and legal evaluation of 
 
54 Supra note 32 at para 44. 
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the facts bearing whether said person can be blamed for the crime.55 This approach 
considers things far beyond what the wrongdoer was thinking to attempt to evaluate the 
other facts in a broader social and moral context. An immediate advantage of this approach 
that is holistic and objective in terms of assessing culpability for deaths caused 
unintentionally is that the trier of fact is not restricted to only evaluating direct evidence of 
the accused’s psychological states. If, in accordance with social and legal evaluation, it has 
been decided that the accused should have acted otherwise then the criminal fault could be 
fairly attributed to the negligent qua careless wrongdoer. This is the theoretical basis that 
motivated the objectivist wing in Tutton.56 
A detailed analysis of each term used in these provisions allows for a deeper 
understanding of how the law is, and ought to be, applied to cases involving these specific 
charges. Furthermore, it assists in the development of my argument that decisions made by 
parents to ignore medical advice and treatments are not reasonable and therefore, the 
defence of mistake of fact should not be available in such cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 George P. Fletcher, “Basic Concepts of Criminal Law” (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1998). 
56 George Fletcher, "Fault of Not Knowing," (2002) 3 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2 at 277. 
32 
 
 
 
6. Failure to Provide the Necessaries of Life 
 Section 215(1)(a)(ii) discusses the failure to fulfill the duty to provide necessaries 
of life where the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the 
duty is owed, or causes or is likely the health of that person to be endangered permanently. 
This section mentions that the person who is under the duty will be held criminally liable 
if the failure to perform the duty is likely to cause a risk to the child’s life. So, what is 
considered objectively foreseeable? Should a prudent parent involved in such crimes be 
able to predict the consequences of their actions? I argue, yes. A reasonably prudent person, 
as discussed earlier, would be able to judge the approximate consequences of their acts or 
omissions. This obligation was further explained in detail in Naglik. 
R. v. Naglik57 
Christine Naglik and her common law husband, Peter Geoffrey People, were 
charged with aggravated assault and failure to provide necessaries of life to their infant son, 
Peter Naglik. Peter, aged 11 weeks, was brought to the hospital after sustaining a number 
of serious injuries including: fractured ribs in at least 15 places, a broken collarbone, a 
fractured vertebra, two skull fractures, and haemorrhaging of the brain and retina. These 
injuries caused permanent and irreversible damage. The injuries were estimated by 
physicians to have been sustained over a period of about four weeks. Naglik provided 
exculpatory statements at trial concerning her child’s condition that were inconsistent with 
 
57 R. v. Naglik, [1993] 3 SCR 122 
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the medical evidence at trial. Naglik did not testify before the judge or jury whereas People 
did testify, denying any involvement in causing injuries to the child.58 
Section 215(1)(a)(ii) penalizes the failure to perform the duty of providing 
necessaries where “the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom 
the duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered 
permanently”. It punished the marked departure from conduct expected of a reasonably 
prudent parent, where it is objectively foreseeable that the failure to provide the necessaries 
would result in a risk of danger to life, or permanent endangerment to the health of the 
child. The Crown is required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstances 
were objectively foreseeable, and the conduct of the accused was a marked departure from 
the standard of care required in such circumstances. As the objective basis of criminal 
liability does not per se violate the Charter, the conviction does not carry a social stigma 
nor such a severe penalty that a conviction based on penal negligence would trigger a 
Charter violation under section 7. The lack of a minimum penalty allows the sentencing 
judge to tailor the sentence to the specific circumstances of the particular offence and 
convict. This eliminates the possibility of being punished at a level that is unproportionate. 
Furthermore, the availability of the defence of lawful excuse under section 215(2) serves 
to prevent punishing morally innocent persons, even where the accused may fail to meet 
the objective test of penal negligence. 
In accordance with the reasons given in Creighton, while determining what the 
accused “ought to have known”, the trier of fact must determine how a reasonable person 
 
58 Ibid at p.129. 
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would have acted in a similar circumstance. These circumstances should not include any 
personal characteristics of the accused that deprive her of the capacity appreciate the risk. 
Youth, inexperience, and lack of education were not considered to have deprived the 
accused of the capacity to appreciate the risk associated with treating her child with neglect. 
Therefore, she must be held to the standard of a reasonably prudent person.  
Naglik was charged under ss. 197(2)(a)(ii) and 197(3) (now ss. 215(2)(a)(ii) and 
215(3)) of the Criminal Code, which make the failure to fulfil the duty to provide 
necessaries an offence where "the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the 
person to whom the duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person 
to be endangered permanently". Section 215(2)(a)(ii) punishes a marked departure from 
the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in such circumstances where the potential risk 
is objectively foreseeable. In this case, it was objectively foreseeable that the failure to 
provide the necessaries of life would lead to the risk of permanent endangerment to the 
health of the child, and potentially a risk of danger to their life. Creighton59 described a 
few offences in which the nature of the unlawful act itself is so risky that the consequences 
are presumed to be objectively foreseeable and give rise to another offence. The 
circumstances under section 215(2)(a)(ii) need to be proven by the Crown, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that they were objectively foreseeable, and the conduct represented a 
marked departure from the standard of care required by those circumstances.60  
 In this section, I discussed what the duty to provide necessaries of life entails and 
what is considered as an “objective foreseeability of risks” arising from the failure of duty. 
 
59 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
60 Ibid at p. 144. 
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Naglik is a leading case that upheld the basis of the criminal charge to require proof of a 
marked and substantial departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
take in those circumstances. This discussion adds to the overall purpose of the MRP as it 
forms the basis for the understanding of the charge of criminal negligence manslaughter. It 
assists in answering a major question: was the conduct of the parents a marked and 
substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person, to the extent that it 
is criminal conduct?  
To this point, I have presented many reasons supporting my argument that mistake 
of fact under a religious belief should not exculpate in cases of criminal negligence. I have 
discussed the fault elements, the fault requirements, and the relevant Criminal Code 
provisions. Let me now turn to considerations having to do with sentencing and 
punishment. 
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7. Sentencing of Offenders 
After considering the fault elements, and detailed explanations of what is required 
to hold an individual accountable for a crime under section 222(5)(b), I move on to the 
considerations made when sentencing the offenders. The Canadian sentencing approach 
requires judges to impose fit sentences that reflect the principles and objectives while 
considering the circumstances of the offence and the offender. The statutory structure 
points at the available sanctions while suggesting the quantum band for each specific 
sanction. Judges recognize sets of factors that affect the gravity of the offence and the 
culpability of the offender then apply the factors to decide on which factors to impose and 
the quantum of each sanction. Depending on the consequential effect of the factors, they 
are known as either aggravating or mitigating factors. Section 718.2(a) of the Criminal 
Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 requires judges to reduce or increase a sentence by considering 
the aggravating or mitigating circumstance applicable to the offender or the offence. 
Examples of aggravating circumstances are listed in the Code, though it is not an 
exhaustive list and many widely discussed factors are not included, meanwhile, there is no 
mention of possible mitigating factors. 
Section 718 outlines the fundamental purposes of sentencing; to protect society and 
to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the 
maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one 
or more of the following objectives: 
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community 
that is caused by unlawful conduct; 
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; 
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(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; 
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; 
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and 
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the 
harm done to victims or to the community. 
 To assess the moral culpability of an offender, it is crucial to consider their state of 
mind which requires a case-by-case analysis. The culpability of the offender is increased 
where they were aware, or wilfully blind, to the fact that their unlawful conduct could put 
their child’s life at risk. The purpose of holding such parents accountable for their actions 
if to establish and enforce a minimum standard of care. Thus, the willingness of an offender 
to adhere to the standards of care is crucial.  
As section 718 points out, there are five main objectives of sentencing. In cases of 
criminal negligence causing death where parents have opted to heal with religion over 
allopathic care, I believe that the most important objectives are denunciation and 
deterrence. Since these cases have periodically been arising, the sentences have been very 
lenient hence, not effectively reflecting these objectives. In the following case, the 
principles of sentencing were considered in accordance with the aggravating and mitigating 
factors to determine an appropriate sentence. 
R. v. Lovett61 
The accused was convicted of criminal negligence causing the death of her seven-
year-old son and failure to provide the necessaries of life – the latter was stayed under the 
 
61 2017 ABQB 703.  
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Kienapple principle.62 The child had become ill with a cold that, because it was left 
untreated, developed into an ear infection causing the child’s tympanic membrane to burst. 
Despite the child’s worsening health, the accused failed to seek medical attention even 
when the illness progressed to cause pain, fever, dark urine, jaundice, and the child was 
unable to stand up. The accused called 911 when the child began slurring his words but 
was declared dead when the paramedics arrived. The child died of sepsis due to group A 
strep and parainfluenza. The child had lost substantial weight and every organ was infected, 
causing him to die an excruciating and unnecessary death. It had been made clear from the 
evidence that antibiotics could have cured the ear infection. the accused acknowledged her 
failure to seek medical attention and that she misjudged the situation. Though she did 
express genuine remorse, she did not accept that medical help could have avoided the 
situation. The Crown sought four to five years’ imprisonment while defence sought one-
year imprisonment plus probation. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment as her 
actions were akin to manslaughter and caused the death of a child who required her 
protection. 
The aggravating factors considered in this case were that the accused did not seek 
medical treatment despite the visible deterioration in the child’s heath over a two-week 
period, so the gravity of the offence was severe. Though the accused did not intend to harm 
 
62 Enunciating the doctrine of res judicata in Kienapple v. The Queen, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729, Laskin 
J. said that the term “best expresses the theory of precluding multiple convictions for the same 
delict, although the matter is the basis of two separate offences.” Furthermore, he stated that the 
“relevant inquiry is whether the same cause or matter (rather than the same offence) is 
comprehended by two or more offences” and that the doctrine should apply where there is a guilty 
verdict on one count and “the same or substantially the same elements make up the offence charged 
in a second count”.  
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her child, her dependence on natural remedies was not working which is an abuse of trust. 
The overall moral blameworthiness was high because she knew the extent of the illness but 
chose to continue following natural remedies that caused Ryan to suffer.63  
Some mitigating factors included her evident remorse, lack of criminal record, low-
risk of re-offending and the suffering caused by the death of her child. Defence argued that 
Ms. Lovett did not intentionally try to inflict harm as she was trying her best to cure him, 
though in a misguided way. The Defence compared this to circumstances in which parents 
intentionally inflict harm or abuse their children and argued that Ms. Lovett’s conduct was 
not malicious nor worthy of high moral blameworthiness.64 Though Ms. Lovett did not 
intentionally mean to harm her child, he was completely dependent on his mother. Her 
misguided views were a form of abuse in the end and her behaviour cannot be considered 
as a momentary lapse of judgement. This raises her moral culpability from the low range 
to the higher end.  
The crown relied on R v Hosannah65, in which the defendants were found guilty of 
manslaughter for failing to properly feed and care for their child. They had an ill-advised 
and negligent vegan diet for the child and ignored medical advice and warning signs as she 
lost weight. She died of malnutrition and asthma complications. A sentence of 30 months 
was imposed. This case is similar because the parents followed their own system and held 
a mistrust of the medical system, leading them to ignore warning signs of problems. 
However, in this case, the death was not directly caused by the malnutrition but also by the 
 
63 Supra note 58 at para. 36.  
64 Ibid at para. 37.  
65 R v Hosannah, 2015 ONSC 2050. 
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asthma attack for which the parents were not faulted. Ms. Lovett’s actions, on the other 
hand, directly contributed to her son’s death. 
The defence in Lovett compared this case to R v Guertin66 in which the accused 
pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessaries of life for his toddler over four days 
who was suffering from an infection that led to his death. The Defence suggested the moral 
culpability was worse in that case because the omission was caused by neglect whereas 
here Ms. Lovett was a doting mother.67 Though it is important to assess the degree of moral 
culpability when deciding the appropriate sentence, it is not correct to say that intentional 
infliction of harm is equal to omission of care. As far as this case is concerned, intentional 
withholding of care amounts to abuse.  
The Criminal Code does not define the term "abuse". Though it is normally associated 
with an act, not an omission, prolonged omissions, such as starvation (failure to provide 
food) or failing to seek and follow medical advice could amount to abuse, especially where 
the conduct is deliberate. This is consistent with the ordinary definition of "abuse". For 
example, the Canadian Oxford Dictionary68 defines "abuse" as "maltreatment of a person", 
and "abusive" as "tending to abuse others: violent".69  
The sentences given in these cases depict a recurring pattern towards the lower end of 
the scale. From the cases discussed above, none of the sentences exceeds 3 years’ 
 
66 R v Guertin, 2016 QCCQ 11256.  
67 Supra note 58 at para. 55. 
68  Canadian Oxford Dictionary, (Oxford University Press: Ontario, 1998) 
69 A thorough discussion of what acts or omissions can be considered “abuse” was discussed in R. 
v. Stephan, 2017 ABCA 380 at para 24. 
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imprisonment.  If all these cases had been handled under section 222(5)(b), the maximum 
penalty could be life imprisonment. Though I do not suggest imposing the maximum, the 
penalty should reflect the individual’s moral culpability. Where the moral culpability is 
high, as it is in most cases in which non-traditional medicine is used, the penalty should 
reflect the same. I argue that the minimum sentence for criminal negligence causing the 
death of a child should be six years’ imprisonment, with a maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment (as it already stands for charges of manslaughter). Since sentencing is so fact 
specific, it is difficult to discern an exact sentence that could uniformly apply to all criminal 
negligence manslaughter cases. 
The basis of this proposal for a minimum sentence of six years’ imprisonment is based 
on several cases in which death was caused by criminal negligence and the deceased was 
a child or a person in necessitous circumstances. Firstly, consider R v Plein70. In this case, 
the respondent was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and given a sentence 
of 14 years – 8 years for manslaughter in the death of his mother Erika and six years’ 
imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death in the death of his sister Cindy. Plein 
had failed to provide the necessaries of life and care to his mother and sister, both whom 
were blind and cognitively impaired and for whom he was the sole caregiver. The trial 
judge concluded that the crime involved an exceptionally high level of moral 
blameworthiness and to be on the “very high end of the moral culpability scale”.71 
 
70 2018 ONCA 748. 
71 Ibid at para 90. 
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In the Ontario decision of R. v. Summers72¸ the father of an infant daughter had pled 
guilty to manslaughter after violently shaking her to death. The Crown agreed that an 
appropriate range of sentence was eight to ten years. He was sentenced to eight years’ 
imprisonment, less credit for time in custody. Another Ontario decision is R. v. 
Desmanche73, in which the respondent was convicted of manslaughter in respect of the 
death of his infant son. He was sentenced to ten years for manslaughter.   
Although these cases can be used for reference for a general sentencing range, they 
cannot be referred to directly because there remain major differences. The parents in cases 
of faith healing deaths do not intend to hurt their child (despite the fact that intention is not 
considered for objective fault offences), nor do they engage in physical conduct for the 
purpose of directly hurting or injuring their child. In my opinion, the act of hitting a child 
or violently shaking them to death are evident aggravating factors that do require greater 
punishments. The cases above suggest sentences higher than 8 to 14 years. However, I 
propose a lower minimum punishment because these parents did not physically lay hands 
on their children, nor did they intend to cause harm to their children. Rather, it was a failure 
of a duty to provide the necessary care and act as a reasonably prudent person would in 
similar circumstances.  
The sentences given in the past to cases of criminal negligence manslaughter based on 
religious influence or a belief in alternative therapies have been three years’ imprisonment 
or less. In my opinion, those sentences do not reflect the sentencing goals of denunciation 
 
72 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 SCR 575. 
73 2016 ONCA 17. 
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nor deterrence. With an increase in the length of penalties, parents of children would, 
hopefully, be more hesitant before opting out of advised medical care. 
Society is shocked when vulnerable children are killed by their own parent(s), the 
persons who hold a position of trust vis a vis that child. Society needs to be assured that 
sentences will deter others who may consider hurting or neglecting their child whether it is 
intentionally or through misguided belief that lead to criminally negligent decisions.  
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8. Analysis 
There is a stark contrast between parents who sincerely, though mistakenly, believe 
their child to be healed and those who want to believe their child is healed. I do not believe 
there is anything mitigating nor exculpatory in the sincere mistake. It is my opinion that 
faith healers, as well as those who resort to alternative medicine or natural remedies, blind 
themselves to the natural and predictable fate of their children.  
The parents in Tutton had claimed to have honestly believed their child to have been 
healed by God. However, my response remains the same. An honest belief should only be 
considered to the extent that is still within the threshold of “reasonable”. Thus, one who is 
reasonable does not permit the death of a child that visibly shows signs of deteriorating 
health. Dickson J. in Pappajohn stated that the defence of mistaken fact should avail in 
objective fault offences when the belief is both honest and reasonable. However, I argue 
there should be a limit on the use of this defence. Although the defence is available in 
principle, a religious belief that is ignorant of repetitive medical advice is neither 
reasonable nor should it be exculpatory in these specific cases of criminal negligence 
causing the death of a child.  
After looking into these cases, from R v. Tutton to R. v. Lovett I strongly believe they 
have been treated with excessive leniency. Where the accused is held legally responsible 
for their failure to provide their child with the necessaries of life, I find no reason to not 
charge all such cases under section 222(5)(b), as were the Tuttons, criminal negligence 
manslaughter, that carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Since each of these 
cases are judged based on their unique characteristics where the fault elements are 
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somewhat lower, I do not propose the maximum penalty to be imposed as a hard and fast 
rule but the sentence should be on the higher end of the range. Also, it would not be 
completely unprecedented to have cases of negligent parents causing the death of their 
children to be convicted for criminal negligence manslaughter as it has already been done 
in cases like Leslie Macdonald and R. v. Blaue. In the cases discussed earlier, the elements 
required to hold an accused liable for criminal negligence manslaughter were fulfilled by 
the parents, so it is disheartening to witness their sentences be so trivial. 
I do not believe it should be relevant that their decision was based on religion. In other 
words, holding an honest religious belief should not be a mitigating factor nor should it act 
as an aggravating factor. Since a religious belief should not exculpate in these cases, it 
should not be a contributing factor in giving greater penalties. The purpose of this paper is 
to suggest just punishments for these acts in consideration that the victims are vulnerable, 
and the excuse is not sufficient to evade persecution. It is not to target a certain sect of 
individuals for their beliefs and practices.  
The central theme in this paper was to critically analyze the way cases are currently 
being dealt with and to present reasons why religious beliefs should not exculpate in cases 
involving criminal negligence causing bodily harm or death. The role of honest beliefs in 
these cases had acted as mitigating factors to give the respondents the benefit of the doubt 
where their actions reflected their mistaken belief. This raises the question. Would it be too 
harsh to charge an individual with manslaughter if they had an honest and reasonable belief 
in faith healing? The answer to this question circles back to the reasonableness threshold. 
Though a free and democratic society gives its people the freedom of conscience, every 
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right comes with a correlative duty. Every parent has the duty to provide their children with 
the necessaries of life and to protect them from foreseeable harm. The children in these 
cases are a part of the most vulnerable section of society requiring extra care.  Should the 
exercise of freedom of conscience be protected even if it causes the death of a child? In my 
view it should not be.   
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9. Conclusion 
Where personal beliefs reflect morality, protect human rights, and promote social 
well-being, there is no grievance in freely exercising conscience and religious belief. 
However, when there is a vast dichotomy between the belief and anything recognizably 
humane, then such beliefs should not be celebrated nor protected. This is particularly so 
when such people behave in ways that society can predict will threaten lives and attract the 
censure of the criminal law.  
If centuries ago, people believed their life and health was dependent on rituals and 
traditions such as keeping demons at bay by chanting around a fire, they were not to be 
blamed. Those communities relied on the best remedies known to them at the time. Today, 
the prosecution might argue to the trier of fact that “rubbing oil on a diabetic child today is 
not the same thing as chanting around a fire a thousand years ago. Every culture at every 
time in history would have known the difference between doing something and doing 
nothing.” 
The freedom to practice a faith should only be exercised to the extent that it does 
not harm another individual’s rights or freedoms. In the cases discussed above, the strong 
religious beliefs of the parents resulted in the death of another human being, which I 
believed should be treated with utmost severity, as would any other case of criminal 
negligence manslaughter. However, looking at the sentences given in past cases, they have 
been very insignificant.  
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No child should die an excruciating and unnecessary death. Though we live in a 
free society where we can make decisions for ourselves, to certain extents, religious 
proponents should be deterred from choosing their own course of action for their children 
in ignorance of medical advice. In liberal democracies around the world, parents must 
realize they are stewards, not the owners, of their children. Though they do have the 
freedom to pass on their own cultural and religious values and beliefs, those values and 
beliefs should not jeopardize or endanger a life.  
Clear guidelines and regulations to educate parents on the expected standard of 
necessitous care, would allow for a better understanding for those who may be under 
mistaken beliefs. Furthermore, harsher penalties would also act as deterrents for religious 
individuals. It is difficult to expect practices to change where the punishments for those 
acts are minimal. Greater penalties, with a minimum of six years’ imprisonment, would 
have great deterrent values. 
I am confident that this study will be of use to those with a particular interest of law 
involving topics of religious healing and use of alternative medicine. The existing literature 
on the topic of faith healing deaths provides a detailed sociological approach though a gap 
remained in the legal sphere. This paper will also be a useful resource for legal scholars 
investigating themes relating to criminal negligence and similar legal topics. I hope this 
paper sparked a further discussion on the morality regarding this topic; where should the 
line be drawn to restrict religious beliefs from infringing the rights of others? 
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